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Pathways to Justice for ‘Atrocity Crimes’ in Myanmar – is there Political Will? 1 
Introduction 
As the dust begins to settle2, the bone-chilling accounts of the Rohingyas f cing ‘excessive 
violence,’ ‘serious violations of human rights’3 and ‘ethnic cleansing’4calls for ending the 
culture of impunity and holding the perpetrators accountable. Despite the contested labelling,5  
Investigating the allegations of atrocity crimes and pursue justice is essential to restore 
‘international legality and the faith of the world community in the triumph of justice and 
reason’ -- as stressed by the Russian envoy during similar crisis in former Yugoslavia,6 and for 
Myanmar’s national reconciliation. But how can we pursue justice for atrocity crimes in the 
absence of the willingness of the state or United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? What 
mechanisms and instruments are available and how are those applicable in Myanmar context?  
The paper seeks to answer these questions exploring the existing scholarship and experiences. 
First, outlining the definitions of genocide, war crimes, the crime against humanity and ethnic 
                                                          
1, The author, wishes to acknowledge the constructive feedback from Professor Dominik Zaum, 
University of reading and Professor Ali Riaz, Illinois State University on the initial draft and two 
anonymous reviews for their insightful comments and suggestions.  
2 Myanmar’s pledge for taking back the refugees reflects an effort to ‘settle the dust.’ See Moe Myint, 
‘Myanmar, Bangladesh to Begin Repatriating Refugees in January’, The Irrawaddy, 20 December 2017. 
3  As stated by the UN Secretary-General. See S/PV.8060, 28 September 2017, p. .    
4. Stated by US Secretary of State. See Rex W. Tillerson ‘Efforts to Address Burma's Rakhine State 
Crisis,’ Press Statement, 22 November 2017.  
5 Apart from the media reporting, the contesting accounts are available in the statemen  by the state 
actors in the UNSC debate. See Thu Thu A ng, ‘Govt Information Committee Objects to UN 
Terminology on Rakhine’, The Irrawaddy, 27 September 2017.  Poppy McPherson, ‘A lot of ‘‘fake 
news’’: Burmese back Aung San Suu Kyi on Rohingya crises, The Guardian, 20 September 2017. 
Michael Shafi, ‘Myanmar treatment of Rohingya looks like ‘‘textbook ethnic cleansing’’, says UN’ The 
Guardian, 11 September 2017. Jonathon Head, ‘Who is burning down the Burmese Villages?’ 11 
September 2017, BBC News. Euan McKirdy, Rebecca Wright, and Z. Saeed, ‘There is ‘‘genocide going 
on there’’ Rohingya huddle on Bangladesh border’, CNN, 4 September 2017. Harriet Agerholm, 
‘Burma soldiers burning bodies of Rohingya Muslims’ to conceal evidence’, The Independent, 4 
September 2017. 
6 The argument is drawn from the statement by the Russian envoy at the UNSC while creating the ICTY. 
See S/PV.3217, 25 May 1993, p. 44. For a persuasive account of the legacy of impunity in Myanmar 
see Sally Kantar, The Myanmar Military's Legacy of Impunity How the Rohingya Crisis Fits a 
Historical Pattern, Foreign Affairs, 14 December 2017. For a historical account of how civilian 
immunity has operated to shape responses to actual cases see Alex J. Bellamy, Massacres nd Morality: 



































































‘Atrocity Crimes’ in Myanmar – is there Political Will? 
2 
 
cleansing (i.e. atrocity crimes) the paper reveals the boundaries for establishing political and 
individual criminal responsibility as set by the global instruments. Exploring the mandates of 
the International Crime Tribunals (ICTs) in former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Rwanda (ICTR), Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), and Cambodia (ECCC), the paper reveals that individual criminal responsibility 
has been the primary focus for all four ICTs. Second, it examines the ratifications, declaration 
upon ratifications of relevant instruments and interaction of Myanmar with the UN on a human 
rights issue to reveal the ‘mind’ of the state and its potential obligations. Third, exploring the 
process of establishing the four ICTs, the paper reveals the centrality of political will and 
outlines three potential pathways for establishing an ICT for the atrocity crimes in Rakhine, 
Myanmar (ICTM-R). It highlights that international political will has often triumphed and/or 
shaped the willingness of the host nation to pursue justice. Fourth, analysing the current 
ideational and material incentives/disincentives to Myanmar the paper outlines its inadequacies 
to change the status quo and suggests ways to harnessing the willingness of the key actors 
reflecting their resolve and commitment to justice and reject impunity. Consequently, the paper 
argues for strong advocacy to reach a consensus mandate to prosecute individuals and not the 
state, precisely defined jurisdiction, and provisions to integrate host nation’s institutional 
apparatus and judicial wisdom can facilitate establishing the ICTM-R.  
Methodology and Scope 
The research is primarily based on content analysis of relevant UN documents; it includes   
examining the Resolutions, Statements, Reports, and Letters by state actors, UN agencies, 
Expert Commissions, Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) related to the four ICTs, human rights 
issues in Myanmar and the declarations upon ratifications of relevant instruments by states. 
The data, news and commentary on the subject are from official websites, credible media 
outlets, peer-reviewed journals and scholarships including Myanmar. The paper is not a 
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evidence, the paper is inclined to the view that a prima facia case of atrocity crimes being 
committed exists in the context of Rakhine, Myanmar and aims to explore the process and 
mechanism to pursue justice. 
Atrocity Crimes Defined   
The collective wisdom of international community has identified three grave nature of crimes 
-- genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as the ‘atrocity crimes’. 7 The ambit of 
atrocity crimes was extended to include ‘ethnic cleansing’ following the pledge by all UN 
member states on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) during the 2005 World Summit at UN 
General Assembly (UNGA).8 All these crimes are legally defined in different Conventions and 
Statute, in particular, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (hereafter Genocide Convention). The genocide is defined as any act committed with 
an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Such 
action may include (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.9 
It recognises that, even though the victims of the crimes are individuals, they are targeted 
because of their membership, real or perceived, in one of the groups. The crimes against 
humanity encompass acts that are part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population.10 The Rome Statute lists eleven such crimes. These includes murder, 
                                                          
7 Such grouping of atrocity crime emerged to facilitate public debate while reflecting its ‘magnitude 
and character’. See David Scheffer, ‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes.’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 
1, 3: 229-250, (December 2006), p.237 and ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for 
Prevention’, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework/, accessed 30 September 
2017, pp.1-3 
8 See A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005. p. 30.  
9 See Article II, The Genocide Convention.  
10 See Article 7, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  Myanmar is not a state 
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extermination, enslavement, deportation/forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other 
severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape/sexual slavery/enforced prostitution/forced 
pregnancy/enforced sterilization/any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious persecution, enforced disappearance, crime 
of apartheid, other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.11 However, for an act to be regarded 
as a crime against humanity, the ultimate target must be the civilian population. Finally, War 
crimes are defined as crimes committed against combatants or non-combatants in international 
or non-international armed conflicts.12 In international armed conflicts, victims include those 
specifically protected by the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.13 In non-international armed 
conflicts, common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions affords protection to “persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause”. Additionally, it includes protection for the medical and religious personnel, 
humanitarian workers and civil defence staffs in both types of conflicts.  
 
‘Ethnic cleansing’ does not have a legal definition.14  However, a working definition was first 
introduced by the UN Commission of Experts investigating the violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia (hereafter Commission of 
Experts). They defined ethnic cleansing as  ‘a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or 
religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of 
                                                          
11 See Ibid.  
12  For details of war crimes see, Article 8, Ibid. 
13 Four Geneva Conventions accord protection to the (a) wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 
(b) shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; (c) prisoners of war; (d) civilian persons, including in 
occupied territory. Myanmar is party to all four Conventions since 25 August 1992. 
14  See UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, 
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another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.’ 15 The R2P document extends 
the realm of atrocity crimes to include ethnic cleansing requiring all states, regional 
organisations and the UN system ‘to give a doctrinal, policy and institutional life' to prevent 
and respond to such crime. 16 The acts codified as ‘ethnic cleansing’ are similar to acts listed 
as genocide and crime against humanity. It also include confinement of civilian population in 
ghetto areas, displacement and deportation, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on 
civilians and civilian areas, use of civilians as human shields, destruction of property, robbery 
of personal property, attacks on hospitals, medical personnel, and locations with the Red 
Cross/Red Crescent emblem.   
 
Despite such well-defined boundaries, every mass killing evokes an emotive ‘political' use of 
these terms. However, the political depiction of atrocity crimes is not necessarily conflicting 
and irreconcilable with the ‘legal-empirical’ depiction. The former is often a part of preventive 
strategy while the latter requires gathering systemic data, facts, and evidence leading to the 
indictment, prosecution, and trial of the perpetrators. The legal codification helps to separate 
the ‘emotive-political’ part and establish the ‘empirical-legal’ account. Thus, the difference 
between ‘political’ and ‘legal’ version collapses when the allegation of atrocity crimes is 
meticulously investigated, evidence are systematically recorded and documented to pursue 
justice. State actors with the capacity and willingness to ensure the rule of law and seek justice 
can provide such separation. But such ideal condition does not always exist. So what 
instruments and mechanisms are available to hold the state and the individuals accountable for 
atrocity crimes in case there is a lack of willingness and capacity? 
 
                                                          
15 See S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, p.33.   
16 Several UN documents highlight the implementations strategy of the R2P to protect the populations 






































































State Responsibility  
According to the Genocide Convention, a state and/or its organs may be held accountable for 
committing genocide. State’s responsibility stems not only from its direct involvement but also 
from failing to prevent any of its organs from committing acts of genocide.17 Some 
international instrument such as the R2P is not legally binding but facilitate invoking the 
genocide doctrine against a state. It provides an accepted and coherent set of frameworks to 
guide effective international response to imminent or occurring atrocity crimes. 18 The R2P 
provisions are based on two core principles. First, upholding the sovereignty norm, R2P 
recognise that the primary responsibility for preventing atrocity crimes lies with the state. 
Second, if the state is unable/unwilling to stop such crime, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international community’s responsibility to protect.19 State that has ‘manifested 
failed’ to protect its population can face a ‘timely and decisive’ external intervention. The R2P 
document suggests a ‘large-scale ethnic cleansing, when carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape’, would constitute a valid condition at which state's sovereignty 
may yield to the international community. The nature of intervention could be diplomatic, 
humanitarian, coercive sanction or in extreme cases military action, often to establish ‘safe 
zones’ to save lives.20 Viewed these way, the R2P provisions appears not an abrogation of 
state’s sovereignty, but a commitment and resolve of the global community to protect humanity 
                                                          
17 See Article I of the Genocide Convention and Alina Lindblom, Elizabeth Marsh, Tasnim Motala, and 
Katherine Munyan, Persecution of The Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in Myanmar’s 
Rakhine State? A Legal Analysis, International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, October 2015; 
and Crimes in Burma, International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School.  
18 Seven UNSC Resolutions between 2006-16 refers to R2P provisions. See Global Centre for 
Responsibility to Protect, http://www.globalr2p.org/, accessed 3 October 2017. 
19 See International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001), pp. xii-xiv.  
20 According to R2P provisions, the military option is an ‘exceptional and extraordinary measure’ and 
can only be justified to prevent ‘serious and irreparable harm' such as large-scale loss of life, ‘ethnic 
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and to strengthen host nation's capacity and willingness to prevent irreparable harm and large-scale 
loss of life of its population. 
 
However, the R2P is also viewed as an ‘interventionist’ political instrument.21 Such a view 
owes to its selective use and practical challenges. Establishing that the state has ‘manifested 
failed’ to protect its population is almost always contested. Evidence presented in the UNSC 
to invoke R2P provisions in the past have been found to be partial, conflated or conflicting. 
The UNSC public debate on Rohingya issue on 29 September 2017 also contained a competing 
account of the issue. The statement by the Russian envoy did not have any m ntion of the acts 
by Myanmar security forces and their supporting militias as documented in the reports, satellite 
images, and statements of the victims by the UN agencies, right groups, and credible media.22
Echoing Myanmar’s statement, the Russian envoy only cited the attack by the Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on security forces and blamed them for ‘massacre of 
civilians’ and arson attacks ‘on entire villages’.23  He also suggested being ‘very precise’ while 
terming the crisis as ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’.  
 
The selective choice of evidence at the UNSC reflects the challenge of attributing political 
responsibility. It leads to inconsistent and uneven decision making by the UNSC resulting rare 
and controversial enforcement of the R2P.24 It also weakens the normative legitimacy of the 
                                                          
21 Recognizing the historical failures of the UNSC, R2P document notes, ‘…faced with conscience-
shocking situations, [UNSC] failed to respond as it should have with timely authorisati n and support'. 
See Ibid, p. 70. Also, see David Chandler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace', 
International Peacekeeping, 11 (1): 59–81 (2004), pp.65-68. Phillip Cuncliffe, ‘A dangerous Duty: 
Power Paternalism and the Global Duty of Care’, Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: 
Interrogating Theory and Practice, (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 51-70.  
22 See, Jonathon Head, ‘Who is burning down the Burmese Villages? 
23 See S/PV.8060, 28 September 2017, p.15.  
24 The inconstancy on implanting R2P was most evident in Darfur and Syria. See Gareth Evans and 
Mohamed Sahnoun, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Foreign Affairs, November/December (2002) and 
Neville F. Dastoor, ‘The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council Committee on the 
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R2P making it challenging to hold the state actors accountable. Thus, harnessing the political 
will of the key state actors to end impunity is the first challenge as it allows to focus on the 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrators and their commanders to pursue justice.  
 
Individual and Command Responsibility 
Most human rights instruments focus on individuals rather than the state to prevent atrocity 
crimes. For example, Article IV of the Genocide Convention focuses on persons irrespective 
of their status, as it states: ‘Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated 
in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public 
officials or private individuals.’ (Italic added). Article V of the same Convention underpins the 
criminal liability of individuals, requiring States ‘to enact necessary legislation’ to provide 
‘effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 
III. ’25 Thus, provisions to hold individuals criminally liable for the commission of such offence 
is fundamental to the definition of atrocity crimes, in addition to imposing state responsibility 
that would enable their prosecution in a Court duly constituted for such purpose.26  
Establishing command responsibility is also integral to deter atrocity crimes and requires 
establishing the criminal-intent of individual commanders.27 However, in most cases, the 
political or military leadership denies their knowledge about their subordinates and what they 
were doing at a particular time. Thus, it is necessary to gather both generic and specific 
information on ‘what the commander knew and what s/he did’ with that information. The 
                                                          
25 The acts under Article III of the Genocide Convention are: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit 
genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) 
Complicity in genocide. 
26 This attribute is considered as one of the five defining characteristics of atrocity crimes. See David 
Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, p. 239.  
27 This was stressed in the Commission of Experts Report. Please see Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
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Commission of Experts outlined 12 indices28 to determine command responsibilities. These 
include the (i) number of illegal acts; (ii) type of illegal acts; (iii) scope of illegal acts; (iv) time 
during which the illegal acts occurred; (v) number and type of troops involved; (vi) logistics 
involved, if any; (vii) geographical location of the acts; (viii) widespread occurrence of the 
acts; (ix) tactical tempo of operations; (x) modus operandi of similar illegal acts; (xi) officers 
and staff involved; (xii) location of the commander at the time. Such information is critical to 
determine the criminal-intent of the commander and help in deciding the command 
responsibility during any prosecution. 
 
The emphasis on the individual’s criminal liability is evidenced by the mandates of the ICTs 
for the trial of atrocity crimes committed in former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Rwanda (ICTR), Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) and Cambodia (ECCC). The ICTR was mandated to ‘prosecute individuals for 
the crime committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighbouring States.'29 Similarly, the focus 
of Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was to prosecute ‘persons who bear greatest 
responsibilities’ for the grave violation of international humanitarian law and SL law. 30 The 
mandate of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was for the trial 
of ‘senior leaders and those most responsible’ for atrocity crimes committed during the period 
of Democratic Kampuchea.31 The focus on individual and command responsibility, as opposed 
to the ‘state’, facilitated serving justice to 252 people through these four ICTs (see table 1). 32  
                                                          
28 The doctrine of command responsibility primarily applies to military/paramilit ry commanders but 
may also involve against political leaders and public officials. See Ibid, pp.17-18. 
29 See ‘The ICTR in Brief’, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal, accessed 23 September 2017. The ICTR 
operation ended on 31 December 2015. 
30 SCSL is considered a ‘hybrid court’ as it involves national and the international elements. See ‘Impact 
and Legacy Survey for the SCSL’, http://www.rscsl.org/, accessed 4 October 2017.  
31 See ‘Key Events’, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/introduction/, accessed 4 October 2017. 
32 The data covers up to 15 October 2017. In 2010, UN established the Mechanism for Internatio al 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT), formally referred to as the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals, with a mandate to perform a few essential functions previously carried out by the ICTR and 
ICTY. There are 85 cases involving 117 individuals who await trial and sentenci g in MICT. See 
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Table 1: Summary of Justice Served by the Four ICTs (number of individuals) 
 ICTY ICTR SCSL ECCC Total 
Indicted/Charged 161 93 13 15 282 
Proceedings concluded 154 85 10 3 252 
Ongoing 7 0 0 3 10 
Acquitted 19 14 0 - 33 
Transferred to State Jurisdiction 13 5 - - 18 
Fugitive/At-large 0 8 1 - 9 
Indictment Terminated/ 
Withdrawn/Died or illness 
37 8 3 3 51 
Suspects yet to be Charged 0 0 0 6 6 
Source: Author’s compilation from ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ECCC official websites.  
 
In sum, attribution of state’s political responsibility for atrocity crimes appears more 
challenging compared to the attribution of criminal responsibility. It begs to explore the 
mechanism and process of establishing the four ICTs to establish the ICTM-R. However, any 
such investigation of the mechanism and process needs to start with the examination of the 
‘mind’ of the state, particularly on the human rights issues-- discussed next.   
 
Reading the ‘Mind’ of Myanmar and the Global Instruments on Atrocity Crimes  
The ‘mind’ of the state about any global norm is often reflected by its commitment and 
compliance of the relevant global instruments on atrocity crimes.33 As a collective social entity 
embedded in global societies of states, state’s ratifications, declarations/reservation on 
ratifications and interactions with the relevant global institutions captures its mind. Thus, we 
focus on the ratification and declaration made by the Government of Myanmar (GoM) on 
                                                          
33 Even though ratifications of a global instrument can be ‘cosmetic’ and/or under pressure, the 
ratification and declarations/reservation made during ratifications, constitute the refection of state’s 
‘mind’. See for Anja Jetschke and Andrea Liese, ‘The power of human rights a decade after: from 
euphoria to contestation?’ , pp. 26-42 and Ann Marie Clark, ‘The normative context of human rights 
criticism: treaty ratification and UN mechanisms’, pp 125-145, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and 
Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, 
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relevant global instruments and the formal reports and replies to those reports on human rights 
situations by the GoM at the UN.   
 
Trends in Ratification and Reservation  
Myanmar acceded to nly five Conventions and one Protocol (see table 2) relating to the 
atrocity crimes and human right issue (see Annex A for the list of international human rights 
instruments). GoM’s ratification trend of human rights instruments is significantly at odds with 
its ratification of Counter-Terrorism (CT) instruments. Before 2001, the GoM was party to four 
CT and human rights instruments each. After 2001, the GoM formed a ‘study group’ to 
examine remaining CT conventions to ratify those;34 by 2006, it became a party to five more 
CT Conventions and ratified ten CT Convention by 2017.35  In contrast, GoM ratified only one 
human rights Convention during this period. Myanmar’s response and preference to ratify 
coercive Conventions over human rights arguably reflects its ‘mind’.  
Table 2: Relevant International Instruments Ratified/Accessed by Myanmar  
International Instruments Ratified/ Accessed/ Signed 
Declaration/ 
Reservation 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 
Accession in 1956 
Article VI & 
VIII 
Geneva Conventions (I – V)  Accession in 1992  
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEADW) Accession in 1997 Article 29 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Accession in 1991 
Withdrew in 
1993 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Accession in 2011 - 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child 
Pornography 
Accession: 2012 - 
Source: Author’s compilation from UN Treaty Collection database 
                                                          
34 See S/2001/1144, 10 December 2001, p.3.  
35 Remaining CT instruments includes Nuclear Terrorism Convention and two Protcols. See UN 
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A comparison of the issues on which states expressed reservations provide a more nuanced 
picture. Table 3 lists the state parties and the Articles of Genocide Convention on which they 
showed reservation. Most reservations relate to involving the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) (Article IX). However, Myanmar's reservations were on engaging International Penal 
Tribunal (IPT) (Article VI) and competent UN organs (Article VIII) for the trial, prevention, 
and suppression of genocide. GoM is the only amongst the 148 signatories who declined to 
engage UN organs under this Convention.  
Table 3: Declarations/Reservation by the Signatory States on 1948 Genocide Convention 
Article What the Article says Declarations /Reservation 
Article 
VI  
‘Persons charged with genocide…shall be tried by a competent 
tribunal of the State…, or by such international penal tribunal 
as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting 
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’ 
Algeria, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Philippines, USA, Venezuela  
Article 
VII  
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not 
be considered as political crimes for the purpose of 
extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such 
cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and 





Contracting party can call upon the ‘competent organs of the 
UN to take such action under the Charter of the UN as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts 




Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, China, India, 
Malaysia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Serbia, Singapore, 




Any Contracting Party by notifying the UN can ‘extend the 
application of the present Convention to all or any of the 
territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that 
Contracting Party is responsible.’ (applicable for countries 
with external territorial jurisdiction)  
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, 
B larus, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Viet Nam 
Source: Author’s compilation from United Nations Treaty Collection database. 
Table 4 lists the nature of the reservations on Article VI to provide more insight to comprehend 
GoM’s ‘mind’. As evident, Morocco and Algeria accept the provision to engage the IPT for 
atrocity crimes under ‘exceptional’ circumstances; the USA and Philippines also do not reject 
but attach preconditions to accept the jurisdiction of the IPT. In contrast, Myanmar and 
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contrary to the most states, Myanmar accepted Article IX, which allows involving ICJ to 
address disputes between state parties. Mentionable that Myanmar had rejected to involve ICJ 
for dispute settlement while ratifying the Convention to Eliminate all kinds of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW, Article 29).   
Table 4: Declaration/Reservations by Countries on Article VI of 1948 Genocide Convention  
Myanmar. Nothing contained in the said Article shall be construed as depriving the Courts and 
Tribunals of the Union of jurisdiction or as giving foreign Courts and tribunals authority over any 
cases of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III committed within the Union 
territory.  
Algeria. International tribunals may, as an exceptional measure, be recognised as having 
jurisdiction, in cases in which the Algerian Government has given its express approval. 
Morocco: May be admitted exceptionally in cases for which the Moroccan Government has given 
its specific agreement.  
The Philippines. Nothing contained in said articles shall be construed as depriving Philippine 
courts of jurisdiction over all cases of genocide committed within Philippine territory save only in 
those cases where the Philippine Government consents to have the decision of the Philippine courts 
reviewed by either of the international tribunals referred to in said articles. 
The USA.  Reserves the right to effect its participation in any such [international] tribunal only by a 
treaty entered into specifically for that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Venezuela. Any proceedings to which Venezuela may be a party before an international penal 
tribunal would be invalid without Venezuela's prior express acceptance of the jurisdiction of such
international tribunal.  
Source: Authors compilation from the UN Treaty Collection.  
Interaction with the UN CEADW Committee 
Myanmar’s communication with the UN CEADW Committee (hereafter Committee) also 
indicates regime’s ‘mind’ and outlook. The GoM submitted five periodic reports to the 
Committee.36  This can be viewed as positive engagement. However, the Committee’s Final 
Recommendations notes several systemic obstacles to human rights situation in the context of 
Rakhine, such as, limitations of the parliament’s legislative power, legal and nationality status, 
widespread gender-based violence, limited access to justice, visibility and participation in 
political and public life, education and employment opportunities 37 The Report also observed 
                                                          
36 The combined 4th and 5th Report was filed in 2015. See CEDAW/C/MMR/4-5, 2 March 2015. Also 
see CEDAW/C/SR.1407, 12 July 2016. 
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the lack of ‘comprehensive law guaranteeing protection against forced displacement or 
programmes…in particular those belonging to ethnic minority groups such as the Rohingya.’38 
Mentionable that the Final Recommendations were made after due deliberation and 
consultation of the reports from the GoM and different CSOs in Myanmar. The CSOs who 
submitted reports to the Committee includes Amnesty International,39 CEDAW Action 
Myanmar (CAM),40 Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW)41, Global Justice Centre (GJC) and 
Gender Equality Network (GEN),42 Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG),43Landesa and 
Namati,44The Arakan Project45, Women Peace Network – Arakan (WPN-A)46, Women's 
                                                          
38 See Ibid, p. 14.  
39 See Amnesty International, ‘64th Pre-sessional Working Group: The Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar - Information on ‘Race and Religion Protection’ Laws and situation of Women Human 
Rights Defenders (WHRDS),’ 29 September 2015, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_21795_E.pdf/, accessed 5 October 2017. 
40 See CAM, ‘Shadow Report on Thematic Issues: Violence against Women to 64th Session of UN 
CEDAW Committee In relation to Myanmar Combined 4th & 5th Periodic Report ’, 23 February 2015, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24427_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October  2017. 
41 See CSW, ‘CEDAW Committee 64th session – Stakeholder Submission’ June 2016. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24254_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. 
42 GJC &GEN, ‘Shadow Report on Myanmar for the 64th Session of the CEDAW Committee July 2016’ 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24273_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. And Global Justice Centre, ‘Promises Not Progress: 
Burma's National Plan for Women Falls Short of Gender Equality and CEDAW', 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_21890_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. 
43 See KHRG, ‘Submission for the 64th session of the Committee on CEDAW, Myanmar, July 2016’, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24239_E.pdf/, accessed 6 October 2017. 
44 Namati and Landesa, ‘Recommendations for Implementation of Pro-Poor Land Policy and Land Law 
in Myanmar: National Data and Regional Practices October 2015’, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_21937_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. 
45 The Arakan Project, ‘Key Issues Concerning the Situation of Stateless Rohingya Women and Girls 
in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Submission to the Committee on CEDAW for the Examination of he 
combined 4th and 5th periodic State Party Reports Myanmar, 10 June 2016’, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24280_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. 
46 See WPN-A, ‘Observations and Topics to be Included in the List of Issues’, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_21938_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. And WPN– A, ‘Submission to the 64th Session CEDAW 
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League of Burma47, and Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC).48 A 
summary of the recommendations related to the Rohingyas from the CSO’s shadow reports is 
in annex B. The Anan Commission Report, submitted before the current spate of violence, also 
notes episodes of serious human rights violations by the security force and recommends 
holding the perpetrators accountable.49 
 
The GoM replied to the Committee’s Final Recommendations stating that ‘the people of 
Myanmar do not recognise the term "Rohingya" which has never existed in Myanmar ethnic 
history.'50 It also requested the Anan Commission for not using the term ‘Rohingya’. As a 
result, the Commission's report does not use the term ‘Bengali' or ‘Rohingya', and refer them 
as ‘Muslims’ or ‘the Muslim community in Rakhine'.51 The denial of an ethnic group appears 
contrary to Myanmar’s constitutional provisions that guarantees ‘non-discrimination based on 
race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth.’ 52   
 
In sum, Myanmar’s minimalist ratification of human rights related instruments and the 
declarations reflects its protective mind aimed to insulate the GoM from external scrutiny. 
Notwithstanding such limitations, an optimistic interpretation of the evidence, such as GoM’s 
                                                          
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24229_E.pdf/, accessed  7 October 2017. 
47 See WLB, ‘Shadow Report on Burma for the 64th Session of the Committee on CEDAW’ 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24233_E.pdf/, accessed 7 October 2017. And WLB, ‘Annex to the Shadow Report on Burma for the 
64th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women', 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MM
R_24233_E.pdf/, accessed 8 October 2017. 
48 MNHCR, A Report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
49 Kofi Anan, ‘Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State’, August 2017, 
http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf, accessed 16 October 
2017, p. 55. 
50  See CEDAW/C/MMR/Q/4-5/Add.1 p.13. 
51 Kofi Anan, ‘Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, p. 12  
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willingness to remain engaged with the UN CEDAW Committee and the legal acceptance of 
Article IX of the Genocide Conventions, hints at the possibility to discuss and engage the ICJ 
in addressing the Rohingya issue by the affected states to pursue justice. With these insights 
about the applicability of global instruments in Myanmar context, let us now turn to the process 
and mechanism of different ICTs to explore the pathways for accountability. 
 
Pathways of Accountability: Establishing the ICTM-R    
Each context of the four ICTs was unique. The Myanmar context also differs as the country is 
not housing any UN troops. More importantly, it is under ‘disciplined democracy’ where the 
military continues to be in the centre of political power d spite having an elected civilian 
government.53 Such contrasts, however, do not restrict us to explore the process and mechanism 
to arrive at some general conclusions to establish the ICTM-R. The broad focus is to find the 
potential pathways that will enable GoM to end the culture of impunity and facilitate harnessing 
the domestic and international political will to pursue justice.   
 
Table 5 provides a brief comparison of the mandate, political will,54and host country’s 
ratification of key global instruments that are vital to the process of establishing ICTs. Political 
will is captured by analysing the votes, statements, and initiatives taken by the external actors 
during the process of establishing the ICTs (international political will). 55 and the host state’s 
degree of consent to the composition and functioning of the Court (national political will). The 
                                                          
53 See, Marco Bünte, ‘Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”: Abdication or 
Institutionalization of Military Rule?’ GIGA Working Papers No 177, August 2011. Casy Cagley, 
‘‘‘Disciplined Democracy’’ – Lessons for Cuba from Myanmar’, Open Democracy, 4 October 2016. 
54  Political will in this context is narrowly defined as the ‘the determination of an individual political 
actor to do and say things that will produce the desired outcome. See Appendix 3. Understanding 
‘Political Will’. (2004) p.1. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/.../R8236Appendix3.pdf/, 
accessed 11 February 2018. 
55 Includes but not limited to the statement/letters by Mexico (S/25417), Canada (S/25504 and 
S/25594, S/25765), Russia (S/2553, S/25829), Brazil (S/25540), USA (S/25575, S/25829); Slovenia 
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regional and extra-regional actors provided qualified support when acting under Chapter VII, 
particularly on the issue about the jurisdiction of the Court (See Annex C for more details).  
For example, in the case of ICTR, Uganda expressed reservation about the concurrent, 
territorial and temporal jurisdiction (Article 7 and 8) of the Court stating that it ‘considers that 
its [Ugandan] judicial system has primary and supreme jurisdiction and competence over any 
crimes committed on Ugandan territory by its citizens or non-citizens, at any particular time’56  
Mentionable that China abstained from voting in ICTR and suggesting the resolution must have 
a domestic legal foundation.
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Table 5: Comparison of the nature and process of establishing the ICTY, ICTR, SCLS, and ECCC. 
ICTY ICTR SCLS ECCC 
1. Mandate: nature and limits 
Prosecute persons responsible for 
specific crimes committed since January 
1991 in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
Prosecute individuals for the crime 
committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and neighbouring States, between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
Prosecute persons who bear greatest 
responsibilities for the grave violation 
of international humanitarian law and 
SL law during the civil war after 30 Nov 
1996. 
Crimes committed between 17 April 
1975 to 6 January 1979 by the s nior 
leaders and those who are most 
responsible in Democratic Kampuchea. 
2. Political Will (international): What UN instrument formally initiated the process of establishing the Court and how did the UNSC vote? 
Acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC 
unanimously (15-0) adopted Resolution 
827 (1993).  
Acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC 
adopted (13-1-1) Resolution 955 
(1994) China: abstained, Rwanda: 
against.  
The UNSC unanimously (15-0) 
adopted Resolution 1315 (2000). 
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECWAS) was 
supportive.  
Commission on HR Resolution 
1997/49, (1997); UNGA Resolution 
A/RES/ 52/135 (1997) A/ RES/ 
53/145, (1999) 
3. Political Will (domestic): Consent and Involvement by the host nation in the Court composition and establishment  
Unwilling acceptance. All 14 Permanent 
Judges appointed by the UNGA and 
UNSC (Ad-litem). Court located outside 
the host country.  
Voted against despite requesting to 
set up the Court with temporal 
jurisdiction from 1 Oct 1990 to 17 Jul 
1994. All judges appointed by UN. 
Court located in Arusha, Tanzania. 
Willing. Requested to set up SCSL in 
light of the Lomé Peace Agreement 
(Article XXVI). The Court in the host 
country (initially); appoints 6/16 
judges. 
Willing and requested to setup ECCC. 
Passed the ECCC Law & signed MoU 
with the UN. The Court is in the host 
country; appoints 3/5 Pre-trial/Trial and 
4/7 Supreme Court Chamber judges.  
4. Party to Key International Instruments on Atrocity Crimes: Ratification/accession 
(i) 1948 Genocide Convention   
Ratified in August 1950 (Former 
Yugoslavia) 
Accession in 1975 (reservations on 
Article IX withdrew in 2008).  
Not a party Accession in Oct 1950 
(ii) 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocols 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (Dec 1992) 
Croatia (May 1992) Serbia (Oct 2001) 
Convention (May 1964), Protocol I & 
II (Nov 1984) 
Convention (June 1965), Protocol I & 
II (Oct 1986) 
Convention (Dec 1958), Protocol I & 
II (Jan 1998) 
(iii) Acceptance of the Competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission according to article 90 of Additional Protocol I  
Bosnia & Herzegovina (Dec 1992), 
Croatia (May 1992), Serbia (Mar 2001) 
Party since July 1997 Not a party Not a party 
(iv) 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (Apr 2002); 
Croatia (May 2002), Serbia (Sep 2001)  
Not a party Party since Sep 2000 Party since Apr 2002. 
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Table 6: Potential Pathways of Establishing ICM-R 







Willing / Willing 
Pathway -1 
(ICTM-R formed on the 
Principles of Complementarity) 
Unwilling/ Willing 
Pathway -2 
(ICTM-R formed outside host 
state under Chapter VII)  
Willing/ Unwilling 
Pathway -3 




(Status quo, No ICTM-R) 
 
The analysis leads to outline three potential pathways to establish the ICTM-R as shown in 
table 6.  It reveals that although a convergence of domestic and international willingness is 
ideal and desirable, the domestic political will is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
establish ICTs. Acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC can establish ICTs even when the host 
state is unwilling and locate the Court outside the host country. Tribunal based only on 
domestic willingness may suffer from legitimacy and neutrality deficits evidence by the ECCC 
(see Annex C). Table 5 also reveals that host nation’s involvement in ICTs has expanded over 
time leveraging the ‘principles of complementarity.’  The findings beg the question: how do 
we harness the international and domestic political will to arrive at a consensus mandate? 
 
Harnessing International Political Will 
Analysing ‘political will’ entails identifying the relevant actors and the incentives/disincentives 
faced by the political actor(s) who is/are in the position of initiating a possible action(s) and 
those faced by other political actors who might support or oppose that/ those action(s).57 
Material incentives such as bi-lateral official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and disincentives such as sanctions and embargoes are often regarded as 
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national instruments, reflecting actor’s political will, particularly in the absence of a consensus. 
Failing to achieve an agreement in the UNSC, the U.S. resorted to the Global Magnitsky Act 
and sanctioned the military commander who oversaw the operation in Rakhine.58 The European 
Union (EU) extended its sanctions on ‘sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related 
material' and provision of technical assistance, brokering and financing services to Myanmar 
military’ to till 30 April 2018.59 However, Myanmar survived harsher sanctions in the past. 
Until 2013, the EU sanctions included 936 entities and 564 individuals (see Figure 1). The U.S. 
imposed similar sanctions but removed 111 entities and individuals from its Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list in 2016.60  
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Annex I - V of Council Decision 2010/232/cfsp 26 April 2010. 
                                                          
58 The U.S. also has a long-standing arms embargo. See ‘Issuance of Global Magnitsky Executive Order; 
Global Magnitsky Designations’, 21 December 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/OFAC-enforcement/Pages/20171221.aspx/ (accessed 25 December 2017) 
59 See Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2013:111:FULL&from=EN/ (Accessed 25 December 2017) and  
Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/734 of 25 April 2017,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0734&from=EN/ (Accessed 25 December 2017). 
60 See ‘Unblocking of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Resulting From the 
Termination of the National Emergency and Revocation of Executive Orders Related to Burma’, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/10/31/2016-26124/unblocking-of-specially-
designated-nationals-and-blocked-persons-resulting-from-the-termination-of/ (accessed 25 Dec 2017)  









Figure 1: EU Sanctions on Myanmar Till 2013






































































Figure 2 compares the FDI and ODA flow to Myanmar and Cambodia for 2000-2015. The flow 
of external assistance to Cambodia closely parallels country’s endorsements to key instruments 
to establish the ECCC. In case of Myanmar, it is paralleled mainly by its reforms towards 
‘disciplined democracy’ and cyclone Nargis. The lifting of the sanctions after 2010 sharply 
increased the aid and FDI flow to Myanmar till reaching a decline. However, it remains well 
above the pre-2010 figures. This evidence tends to suggest a link between the political will of 
external actors to the domestic context. 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from World Development Index Data.  
Figure 3 breaks down the ODA to Myanmar concerning top 20 donors to identify critical actors. 
The ‘political will’ of these donors in general and Japan in particular, to pursue justice for the 
















Figure 2: Flow of FDI and ODA to Myanmar and Cambodia  2000-2015
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 Figure 3: Top 20 Donors of ODA to Myanmar 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from the World Development Index Data.  
 
China and Russia’s unreserved support to Myanmar owes to a complex set of geopolitical 
considerations, security issues, transit rights, access to natural resources, energy and military 
sales 61– detail examination of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, figure 4 
shows Myanmar’s weapon purchase between 2001-2016. 62  Evidently, the western arms 
embargo was pivoted mainly by the supply from Russia and China. Justifying the recent sale 
of six Sukhoi jets to Myanmar, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister remarked that these jets 
are ‘crucial for protecting the country’s [Myanmar’s] territorial integrity and countering 
terrorist threats.’63  Such reasoning shows how the crisis is used as an opportunity. The sharp 
increase of weapon sale after 2010 tends to suggest that the lifting of the western sanctions 
served as an incentive for China and Russia to beef up their supply to Myanmar. 
                                                          
61 See David I. Steinberg, and Fan Hongwei (2012), Modern China–Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of 
Mutual Dependence, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp.306-342. 
62 SIPRI's Trend Indicator Value (TIV) accounts ‘known unit production costs of a core set of weapons' 
rather than the price paid. See SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Methodology, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/ (accessed 27 December 2017).  
63 Emphasis added. See ‘Russia ignores US charges over Sukhoi fighter jet supplies to Myanmar — 







































































Source: Author’s compilation from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
In sum, the current state of material incentives/disincentives looks insufficient to change the 
status quo. The collective political will of the key external actors are fr ctured and inadequate 
to effect change pursuing justice for the atrocity crimes. Such a condition begs to notch up the 
material disincentives such as targeted sanctions and global arms embargo. Such action may 
have a secondary effect encouraging/restricting Russia and China to limit their supply of arms 
to Myanmar military. Similarly, the bilateral aid to Myanmar needs to be, at l ast, conditional 
and/or staggered to facilitate achieving specific actions towards justice.     
 
Analysing the material factors do not tell the whole story of an actor's political will. Political 
will is also about ‘motives, thinking, and feelings' of the actor and other political actors 
pursuing or opposing the same aims.64 It is difficult to proxy such intangible aspects. However, 
some evidence can be drawn from China and Russia’s ‘thinking and feelings’ from their past 
actions in the UNSC to establish two ICTs under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Russia voted 
in favour of establishing the ICTY and ICTR (pathway 2). As the President of the ICTY 
committee, Russia co-sponsored the draft Resolution stating ‘the entire international 
                                                          






















Figure 4: Trend in Myanmar's Arms & Weapon Import  2001-2016
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community …, through the Tribunal, will be passing sentence on those who are grossly 
violating not only the norms of international law but even quite simply our human concepts of 
morality and humanity (italic added).’ 65 China provided qualified support to establish ICTY66 
and abstained from voting during the ICTR.67 China regarded that perpetrators of such crimes 
‘should be brought to justice’ and called the UN to adopt a ‘prudent attitude’ by signing a treaty 
with the host country to provide ‘solid legal foundation’ of the Court.68 Apart from providing 
funding, Russian and Chinese judges have also served in the ICTs.  
 
China's one belt one road (OBOR) project that runs through the Rakhine state has also been 
referred as the critical geopolitical reason for its unreserved support to Myanmar. 69 However, 
pushing the allegation of atrocity crimes under the rug, committed in its neighbourhood risks 
not only tainting China’s OBOR project – an unnecessary price for a benevolent and unique 
initiative, but also dampening China’s growing clout of ‘soft power.’ The three-stage approach 
suggested by China hints at a regional solution to resolve the crisis to salvage a global 
backlash.70 The proposal includes: (i) effecting a ceasefire on the ground, (ii) safe repatriation 
of the refugees and (iii) a plan for the economic development of Rakhine. However, current 
Chinese program does not include investigating the allegation and/or prosecuting the 
perpetrators and stands at odds with its past moral position in the UNSC.   
 
                                                          
65  See S/PV 3217, 25 May 1993, pp.44-45.  
66  The Chinese envoy to the ICTY meeting stated that ‘This political position of ours, however, should 
not be construed as our endorsement of the legal approach involved’ adding that the ICTY can only be 
an ‘ad hoc arrangement’ and shall not ‘constitute any precedent’. See Ibid, p.32-33.  
67 See S/PV.3453, 8 November 1994, p. 11. 
68 Ibid, p.33. 
69  See Parth Sharma, Rohingya Crisis: The Larger Geopolitics Nobody Is Talking About, The 
Huffington Post, 23 September 2017. The Siasat Daily ‘What connects Rohingya genocide with China’s 
7.3 billion investment in Rakhine state?’ Saibal Dasgupta, China’s huge Rakhine investment behind its 
tacit backing of Myanmar on Rohingyas, The Times of India, Sep 26, 2017. 
70  See Yimou Lee, China draws a three-stage path for Myanmar, Bangladesh to resolve Rohingya crisis, 
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Be that as it may, the overall evidence tends to suggest that Russia and China are not 
fundamentally opposed to the idea of pursuing justice. Russia has been party to both pathway 
1 and 2. In contrast, China seems to prefer a consensus pathway (pathway 1 and 3). Given 
China's strong preference for host country's endorsement to establish ICTs, it is plausible to 
assume that China will prefer pathway 3, reached through a bi-lateral/regional consultation. 
 
The Rohingya crisis is also labelled as an ‘ASEAN challenge’ calling the regional body for 
effective action71 in light of its Charter72 and the Huma Rights Declarations.73 Three ASEAN 
countries (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) houses significant Rohingya refugees. Despite 
compelling reasons, ASEAN’s ‘political will’ to address the issue, let alone pursuing justice is 
missing. Several channels like the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR), ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies,74 and the office of the ASEAN Secretary and 
the Troika75 have remained silent.76 Popular support and sympathy towards the Rohingyas in 
ASEAN cities77 contrasts such lack of political will. A strong willingness can also iron out the 
                                                          
71 See, The Rohingya Crisis and the Risk of Atrocities in Myanmar: An ASEAN Challenge and Call to 
Action, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, April 2015. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Rohingya 
refugee crisis shames Southeast Asia, The Japan Times, 21 May 2015. Jera Lego, Why ASEAN Can't 
Ignore the Rohingya Crisis, The Diplomat, 17 May 2017.  
72, The purpose and principles of the ASEAN Charter emphasise the promotion and protection of human 
rights and freedom stressing the rights and responsibilities of member states. See, The ASEAN Charter, 
http://asean.org/, (Accessed 9 February 2018) 
73 The declaration recognises the need for accountability (Article 9) but refers to the ASEAN Charter 
for the parameters to promote and protect human rights (Article 39). See ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, http://aichr.org/documents/, (Accessed 9 February 2018)  
74 For example, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defence Senior 
Officials Meeting (ADSOM) provides a platform to engage the Myanmar military.  
75 ASEAN Troika consists of the Foreign Ministers of the present, past and future chairs of its Security 
Committee. It was set up to address urgent and important regional political and security iss es. 
76 The 2017 summit declaration did not mention the Rohingya issue but expressed support for the 
country's efforts to bring peace and harmony to northern Rakhine.  See ASEAN silent on Rohingya 
crisis, The Daily Star, 17 November 2017. For the evidence of AICHR silence see Gamez, K. Ramos, 
Examining the AICHR: The Case Study of The Rohingya Crisis, A dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of LL.M. in International and European Law (International 
Human Rights Law), Tilburg University, June 2017.  
77 Support are evidenced not only by the rallies and protests but also government actions. Apart from 
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challenges and empower the AICHR by expanding its mandate to include country visits to 
inquire and record complaints about serious human rights violations. It can lead to establishing 
a joint UN-ASEAN project for an independent and impartial investigation of human rights 
violations in Rakhine. Singapore – the new ASEAN Chair is better poised to persuade 
Myanmar as it is one of the most significant trading and FDI partners of Myanmar.78 It needs 
to be emphasised that there has always been a general reticence to the human rights discourse 
and lukewarm response to such issues by the ASEAN states.79 The doctrine of ‘development 
ought to precede human rights', and the need for maintaining amicable foreign policy 
contributed to such ambivalence to deal with human rights violations.  
 
In sum, international ‘political will’ on this issue is marred by inconsistent actions of the key 
actors. First, the current state of external incentives/disincentives is neither conducive nor 
sufficient to persuade Myanmar to pursue justice. Thus, the flow of ODA and FDI, exercise of 
the sanctions and arms embargoes by the key political actors including Japan and Singapore 
needs to be fine-tuned and conditioned reflecting their resolve and commitment to ending the 
culture of impunity for atrocity crimes. Second, to reconcile the geo-strategic concerns, a 
consensus mandate for the ICTM-R focusing on prosecuting the perpetrators and not the state 
and keeping provisions to integrate GoM’s judicial and institutional capacity may be helpful. 
Such an approach may encourage China and Russia to stand by their moral principles as 
maintained during the ICTY and ICTR. The combined efforts could persuade Myanmar and 
thus follow pathway -1 without invoking Chapter VII by the UNSC. However, in case 
Myanmar rejects the consensus proposal, pathway -2 remains open invoking Chapter VII and 
                                                          
78 Within the ASEAN, Singapore has the highest FDI to Myanmar reaching from US$120 million in 
2012 to US$1,541.18 million in 2016. See  https://data.aseanstats.org/#, accessed 12 February 2018.  
79 See Hsien-Li Tan, The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: Institutionalising 
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the Court will have to be established in any of neighbouring countries. Indeed, Myanmar’s 
national security advisor U Thaung Tun has recently stated that the UN may invoke the 
Genocide doctrine to intervene in Rakhine under the R2P principle.80 
 
Harnessing Domestic Political Will 
Myanmar’s domestic ‘political will’ needs to be viewed considering the brittle power 
equilibrium between the military and civilian leadership propped by the deep-rooted hatred 
against the Rohingyas. Such condition has constrained the political leadership and blinded their 
moral judgements pushing to take a utilitarian approach hindering justice. The limited civilian 
space and the rising influence of the Buddhist nationalist make it a ‘political suicide' for anyone 
siding with the Rohingyas, let alone seeking justice.81 Thus, the domestic willingness has so 
far remained deflationary and resulted in replacing the commander of Western Command and 
acquitting the security forces of any wrongdoing through an internal investigation.82 The 
civilian leadership has apparently allied with the military, losing their hard-earned support and 
legitimacy from the international community through prolonged struggle.83  
 
It is demanding but not impossible to conceive a change of the domestic political will. Apart 
from fine-tuning the external incentives/disincentives as discussed above, it would require, a 
renewed advocacy and sensitisation. The activities of several CSOs in Myanmar (see Annex 
                                                          
80  The Security Advisor’s remarks came after Myanmar was listed as ‘red colour country’ by the UN. 
See Lawi Weng, ‘Govt Frets UN Will Invoke Genocide Doctrine to Intervene in Rakhine’ The 
Irrawaddy, 27 November 2017. 
81 See Aye Thein, Putting Myanmar’s ‘Buddhist Extremism’ in an International Context, The 
Irrawaddy, 3 September 2017.     
82 The investigation was led by Inspector-General of Defence Services, Lt-Gen Aye Win. See ‘Myanmar 
Army Denies Abuses against Rohingya after Investigation,’ The Irrawaddy, 14 November 2017. 
83 See, ‘Rohingya Refugee Crisis: It's Not Muslims vs Buddhists, Says Writer Bertil Lintner’ The 
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B) testifies that such ‘agency’ to initiate change exist.84 As the legitimate representative of the 
Union, the civilian leadership needs to recognise the gravity of the issue and declare an end to 
impunity for such crimes. The elected leadership needs to expand the civilian space embracing 
the fact that providing impunity for atrocity crimes is not compatibility with democratic value, 
peace and reconciliation. Just as the new political leadership has introduced the idea of 
‘democratic federal union’, challenging the old ‘unitary idea’ of statehood to consolidate 
democracy and reconciliation,85 they need to stand up for ending impunity to place Myanmar 
alongside the global democratic polity earned through so many struggles and sacrifices. 
Dispensing political expediency, such bold step by the civilian leadership can instil respect for 
human rights, sympathy for the victims and consolidate peace and democracy, contributing to 
the pursuit of justice. Conversely, any delays/absence of taking such bold steps can shrink the 
civilian space further.  
 
Second, the military leadership needs to view national security in terms of protecting and 
benefitting the people and not the military alone. The prolonged military rule has created an 
uneven society in Myanmar as evidenced by the data of Global Militarisation Index (GMI) 
plotted in figure 5. The GMI projects a relative account of country’s military expenditure, 
personnel and heavy weapons purchase with societal factors like health spending, number of 
                                                          
84  For example, over 100 CSOs in Myanmar signed a letter in opposition to the "Protection of Race and 
Religion Bills," advanced by the influential ultra-nationalist group Ma-Ba Tha engaged to inflame anti-
Muslim prejudice and fear (ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, p.5). CSOs like the Global 
Justice Center (GJC) and the Gender Equality Network (GEN) have also spoken out to eliminate 
impunity calling for the trial of military personnel accused of such crimes (Shadow Report on Myanmar 
for the 64th Session of the CEDAW Committee July 2016, p.24).  
85 The idea of a federal union was considered a taboo under the military. The new Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement (NCA), initiated in 2011, is based on the idea of a ‘democratic federal union'. The new 
government agreed it during the formulation of the NCA. See Thein TT. Burmese govt agrees, in 
principle, to a federal union. DVB, 16 August 2014,  https://www.dvb.no/news/burmesegovt-agrees-in-
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to physicians, and population. The overall militarisation score thus reflects the relative weight 
and importance of the military apparatus of the state in relation to its society. 86   
 
Source: Author’s compilation from GMI data. 
The trend suggests that the military was mostly unscathed by the sanctions. The trend in 
militarisation started to decline sharply after 2000 coinciding with harsher western penalties, 
only to reach new heights in 2010 which coincides with the lifting/easing up of the sanctions. 
Increased external assistance after 2010 allowed to free up more assets, resulting from an 
increased militarisation and at a much higher speed.87   
 
                                                          
86 The total militarisation score (4) is based on three dimensions: (1) military expenditure and 
(2) personnel dimension, based on a weighted scale of 0 (lowest) - 8 (highest) and the (3) heavy 
weapons index, based on a 0 (lowest) to 4 (highest) scale. See Mutschler, Max., M., Global 
Militarization Index, 2016, BICC, Bon, Germany, https://gmi.bicc.de/ (Accessed 10 February 2018).  
87  For example, GoM’s health spending after 2010 had a little increase, reaching 3.59 percent in 2014, 
while the military expenditure jumped from 9-12 percent to 15-18 percent in 2015. See Yu M., Win 
Khine L., Shiao, L. Wen-Shuan, Thandar, Moe M., Amiya, Rachel M., Shibanuma, A., Tun, Soe Saw,, 
and Jimba, Masamine (2013) Taking stock of Myanmar’s progress toward the health-related 
Millennium Development Goals: current roadblocks, paths ahead, International Journal for Equity in 
Health, http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/12/1/78/, accessed 28 November 2017.World 
Development Indicators, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators/ 


















































n Figure 5: Militarisation Trend in Myanmar 1990-2015
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This evidence shows that Myanmar’s transition to democracy came at a price, in which the 
military continues to benefit the most. Thus, country’s civilian polity needs to reclaim their 
position, demand distributive justice of the internal and extern resources that are meant for 
improving their lives. A renewed reflection of the key actors about the nature and conditions 
of material assistance to Myanmar and their utilisation can shape the domestic political will. 
Such reflection will help the military to realise adopting people-centric national security 
abandoning the culture of impunity as it risks tainting the total forces. This may encourage the 
military to single out the units and individuals who committed or conspired to the atrocity crime 
and make them accountable to remove the stigma attached to the Myanmar military.  
 
Apart from legislative approval (as in Cambodia), peace treaty (as in Sierra Leone) is also a 
legitimate anchor for domestic ‘political will’.88 In Myanmar context, domestic instruments 
and institutions such as the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and National 
Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) 89 could be useful to pursue justice. Despite a 
conditional and exclusionary practice,90 the NCA provides a starting framework as it 
guarantees the political dialogue (Chapter 5) and suggests confidence-building measures such 
as health, education, and socio-economic service delivery provisions under “int rim 
                                                          
88 See the Summary Report, 7th colloquium of international Prosecutor, Local Prosecution of 
International Crime 4-5 November 2014, Arusha, Tanzania, [Online] 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/141104-7-colloquim-of-international-
prosecutors-en.pdf/ (Accessed 25 December 2017) 
89 The NCA is the first negotiate multilateral ceasefire agreement formalised on 31 March 2015, 
outlining a 7-step roadmap for peace and national reconciliation. The NRPC is the successor of 
Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) formed vide Presidential Order 50/2016. It is under the Office of State 
Counsellor and mandated for national reconciliation & peace processes, coordination with ethnic 
groups, civil society, international donors, and experts. See National Reconciliation & Peace Centre, 
Summary, http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/227-nrpc, (accessed 
8 November 2017).   
90  The excluded Ethnic Armed Groups in the NCA includes bigger groups like Arakan Army (AA), 
Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army 
(TNLA), and smaller groups like Arakan National Council (ANC), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), 
Wa National Organization / Army (WNO). See The Institute for Security and Development Policy, 
Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement: Background, October 2015, p. 2. www.isdp.eu, 


































































Pathways to Justice for ‘Atrocity Crime’ in Myanmar – is there Political Will? 
31 
 
arrangements” (Chapter 6) that are conducive to pursue justice. The combined political will of 
the civilian and military leadership can function through the NRPC facilitating the 
establishment of either a State Tribunal without any external involvement (pathway 3) or the 
ICTM-R (pathways 1). Such possibilities satisfy the Chinese view at the UNSC that ‘a viable 
solution will be one that goes hand in hand with the peace and reconciliation process in 
Myanmar.’91 However, justice through State Tribunal (pathway-3) may suffer from legitimacy 
deficit and hinder unrestricted funding from the external sources as evidenced in Cambodian.   
 
Domestic and International Advocacy   
Beyond state agencies, advocacy by the CSOs, institutions, and academia can also harness 
political will.  This was particularly evident in the case of ECCC that has the most chequered 
history of coming into operation. The Cambodian Genocide Project, Inc. established by the 
Yale Law School in 1981 and supported by many including the U.S. Institute of Peace, helped 
to gather documentary evidence and videotaped testimony of many eyewitnesses.92 Th  
Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge (CORKR) was instrumental in its 
advocacy leading to the adoption of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act by the U.S. Congress 
in 1994.  The Yale and Harvard Law School have already published legal analysis and reports 
on the atrocity crimes in Myanmar.93 The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), held open 
(people’s) trial on the issue.94 As discussed before, several other CSOs inside Myanmar are 
also working on the human rights issue. The ‘soft power’ of these advocacy groups, including 
the brave evidence-based reporting by reputed media, can facilitate harnessing the political 
will. 
                                                          
91 See S/PV.8060, 28 September 2017, p.14 
92 Gregory H. Stanton, Seeking Justice in Cambodia.   
93 Persecution of The Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in Myanmar’s Rakhine State? A 
Legal Analysis, Op Cit., and Crimes in Burma, Op Cit.  
94 See Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, State Crimes Allegedly Committed in Myanmar against the 






































































A verified and cross-referred initial database on the atrocity crimes prepared by such advocacy 
groups would be invaluable to influence collective and individual state action through UN or 
ASEAN under the ‘just cause’ criteria95 and subsequent prosecution. Several UN entities and 
agencies are mandated for data collection on such crimes. 96 The UN Office for Genocide 
Prevention and R2P is mandated for, among others, (i) collection and assessment of 
information on situations worldwide, (ii) sending fact-finding missions, (iii) dissemination of 
monthly reports to UN partners (iv) preparation and dissemination to UN partners of analytical 
briefings on country situations. (v) promote systematic and cohesive information gathering and 
assessment by the UN on situations at risk of atrocity crimes.97 The division for Advancement 
of Women of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs is authorised to document, 
disseminate and analyse data on gender-based violence and update their searchable database/ 
portal. Credible media houses and regional bodies are also acceptable sources. Relentless 
advocacy by the CSOs, right groups and international organisations bolstered by the media 
reporting can galvanise support and encourage state actors to take actions.  
 
Concluding remarks 
‘Political will’ is not a neutral concept. It can produce both benign and invidious outcomes. 
The atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingyas was not a product of ‘limited statehood’ 
but a product of the fractured and invidious nature of the ‘political will’ of the key domestic 
and international actors. Such a state of ‘p litical will’ privilege immunity over justice. Despite 
the legislative power criminalising atrocity crimes and important institutional development to 
                                                          
95 For details on threshold criteria for ‘just cause’, see CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 32-35 
96  For example, A /Res61/143, 19 December 2006, mandates relevant UN entities and other reginal 
intergovernmental organisations for ‘data collection, processing and dissemination of data, including 
data disaggregated by sex, age and other relevant information, for their possible use' particularly on all 
forms of violence against women.     
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implement those, the relation of power and privileges between and within the domestic and 
international actors have triumphed in the context of Myanmar, according immunity to the 
perpetrators. The ascendancy of the culture of immunity trickles down empowering the 
perpetrators to hide their criminal responsibilities. Competing accounts of the situation are 
generated feeding the key actors to justify and strengthen the immunity. However, such a 
condition is not perpetual. Political will can change. Outlining three potential pathways, this 
paper suggests how the political will of the global and local actors can be harnessed to pursue 
justice. It shows that a precisely defined mandate to prosecute the individuals and not the state 
and provisions to integrate host nation’s instruments and capacity could be a viable framework 
to establish the ICTM-R. It shows that harnessing the ‘political will’ to pursue justice entail 
fine-tuning the material incentives/disincentives to Myanmar reflecting the resolve and 
commitment of the UNSC and key actors like Japan and Singapore to end the culture of 
impunity. Within Myanmar, the civilian leadership needs to reclaim and expand the civilian 
space while the military needs to view national security in holistic terms and not just their 
interests as it risks tainting the total forces for committing atrocity crimes.  Finally, the 
advocacy by right groups and institutions remains an essential catalyst to the entire process of 
harnessing the political will to pursue justice in Myanmar.   
 
Annex A: International Instruments on Human Rights and Atrocity Crimes   
Annex B: Summary of the CSOs Shadow Report on Human Rights Situation in Myanmar to the 
UN CEDAW Committee, 2015-2016 



































































Table 1: Summary of Justice Served through the Four ICTs (number of individuals) 
 ICTY ICTR SCSL ECCC Total 
Indicted/Charged 161 93 13 15 282 
Proceedings concluded 154 85 10 3 252 
On going 7 0 0 3 10 
Acquitted 19 14 0 - 33 
Transferred to State Jurisdiction 13 5 - - 18 
Fugitive/At large 0 8 1 - 9 
Indictment  Terminated/ 
Withdrawn/Died or illness 
37 8 3 3 51 
Suspects yet to be Charged 0 0 0 6 6 







Table 2: Relevant International Instruments Ratified/Accessed by Myanmar  
International Instruments on Human Rights and 




1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide 
Accession 14 Mar 
1956 
Declaration on 
Article VI & VIII  
1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights  
Signed in 2015 
but not ratified. 
- 
1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEADW) 
Accession in 1997 Declaration on 
Article 29  
1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child  Accession in 1991 Withdrew 
declaration in 1993 
2008 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  Accession in 2011 - 
2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict  
Signed in 2015 
but not ratified. 
- 
2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography 
Accession: 2012 - 





Table 3: Declarations/Reservation by Signatory States on 1948 Genocide Convention 
Article What the Article says Declarations /Reservation 
Article 
VI  
‘Persons charged with genocide…shall be tried by a competent 
tribunal of the State…, or by such international penal tribunal 
as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting 
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’ 
Algeria, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Philippines, USA, Venezuela  
Article 
VII 
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not 
be considered as political crimes for the purpose of 
extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such 
cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and 





Contracting party can call upon the ‘competent organs of the 
UN to take such action under the Charter of the UN as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts 




Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, China, India, 
Malaysia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Serbia, Singapore, 




Any Contracting Party by notifying the UN can ‘extend the 
application of the present Convention to all or any of the 
territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that 
Contracting Party is responsible.’ (applicable for countries 
with external territorial jurisdiction)  
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, 
B larus, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Viet Nam 





Table 4: Declaration/Reservations by Countries on Article VI of 1948 Genocide Convention  
Myanmar. Nothing contained in the said Article shall be construed as depriving the Courts and 
Tribunals of the Union of jurisdiction or as giving foreign Courts and tribunals jurisdict on over any 
cases of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III committed within the Union 
territory. 
Algeria. International tribunals may, as an exceptional measure, be recognized as having 
jurisdiction, in cases in which the Algerian Government has given its express approval. 
Morocco: May be admitted exceptionally in cases with respect to which the Moroccan Government 
has given its specific agreement. 
Philippines. Nothing contained in said articles shall be construed as depriving Philippine courts of 
jurisdiction over all cases of genocide committed within Philippine territory save only in those cases 
where the Philippine Government consents to have the decision of the Philippine courts reviewed by 
either of the international tribunals referred to in said articles. 
USA.  Reserves the right to effect its participation in any such [international] tribunal only by a 
treaty entered into specifically for that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Venezuela. Any proceedings to which Venezuela may be a party before an international penal 
tribunal would be invalid without Venezuela's prior express acceptance of the jurisdiction of such
international tribunal.  




Table 5: Comparison of the nature and process of establishing the ICTY, ICTR, SCLS and ECCC. 
ICTY ICTR SCLS ECCC 
1. Mandate: nature and limits 
Prosecute persons responsible for 
specific crimes committed since 
January 1991 in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia. 
 
Prosecute individuals for the crime 
committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and neighbouring States, between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
Prosecute persons who bear greatest 
responsibilities for the grave violation 
of international humanitarian law and 
SL law during the civil war after 30 Nov 
1996. 
Crimes committed between 17 April 
1975 to 6 January 1979 by the s nior 
leaders and those who are most 
responsible in Democratic Kampuchea. 
2. Political Will (international): What UN instrument formally initiated the process of establishing the Court? 
Acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC 
unanimously (15-0) adopted 
Resolution 827 (1993).   
Acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC 
adopted (13-1-1) Resolution 955 
(1994) China: abstained, Rwanda: 
against.  
The UNSC unanimously (15-0) 
adopted Resolution 1315 (2000). 
Commission on HR Resolution 
1997/49, (1997); UNGA Resolution 
A/RES/ 52/135 (1997) A/ RES/ 
53/145, (1999) 
3. Political Will (domestic): Consent and Involvement in the Court composition and establishment  
Unwilling acceptance. All 14 
Permanent Judges appointed by the 
UNGA and UNSC (Ad-litem). Court 
located outside the host country.  
Voted against despite requesting to 
set up the Court with temporal 
jurisdiction from 1 Oct 1990 to 17 Jul 
1994. All judges appointed by UN. 
Court located in Arusha, Tanzania. 
Willing. Requested to set up SCSL in 
light of the Lomé Peace Agreement 
(Article XXVI). Court located in host 
country (initially). GoSL appoints 6/16 
judges. 
Willing. Requested to setup ECCC. 
Passed the ECCC Law & signed MoU 
with the UN. Court is in host country 
who appoints 3/5 Pre-trial & Trial and 
4/7 Supreme Court Chamber judges.  
4. Party to Key International Instruments on Atrocity Crime: Ratification/accession 
(i) 1948 Genocide Convention   
Ratified in August 1950 (Former 
Yugoslavia) 
Accession in 1975 (reservations on 
Article IX withdrew in 2008).  
Not a party Accession in Oct 1950 
(ii) 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocols 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  (Dec 1992) 
Croatia (May 1992) Serbia (Oct 2001) 
Convention (May 1964), Protocol I & 
II (Nov 1984) 
Convention(June 1965), Protocol I & II 
(Oct 1986) 
Convention (Dec 1958), Protocol I & 
II (Jan 1998) 
(iii) Acceptance of the Competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission according to article 90 of Additional Protocol I  
Bosnia & Herzegovina (Dec 1992), 
Croatia (May1992), Serbia (Mar 2001) 
Party since July 1997 Not a party Not a party 
(iv) 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (Apr 2002); 
Croatia (May 2002),Serbia (Sep 2001)  
Not a party Party since Sep 2000 Party since Apr 2002. 














International Political Will  
Willing / Willing 
Pathway -1 
(ICTM-R formed on the 
Principles of Complementarity ) 
Unwilling/ Willing 
Pathway -2 
(Chapter VII invoked to form 
ICTR-M outside host state)  
Willing/ Unwilling 
Pathway -3 










Source: Author’s compilation from Annex I - V of Council Decision 2010/232/cfsp 26 April 2010. 








Figure 1: EU Santions on Myanmar Till 2013
(Number of Entities and Individuals)
Figure -1 Click here to download Figure Fig 1-EU Sanctions on
Myanmar.docx
 


















Figure 8: Flow of FDI and ODA to Myanmar and Cambodia  2000-2015
(BoP, Current US$)
Net FDI inflow (Cambodia)
Net DAC ODA (Cambodia)
Net FDI inflow (Myanmar)


















    Figure 3: Top 20 Donors of ODA to Myanmar 2000-2015 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from World Development Index Data. 


































Figure 4: Trend in Myanmar's Arms & Weapon Import  2001-2016
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n Figure 5: Militarisation Trend in Myanmar 1990-2015
Military Expenditure (1) Military Personal (2)
Heavy Weapons (3) Militarisation Score (4)
Figure -5 Click here to download Figure Fig 5- Militarisation-MMR.docx 
Annex A: International Instruments on Human Rights and Atrocity Crime  
List of United Nations Human Rights Conventions and protocols  Status of Myanmar  
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Paris, 9 December 1948 Party since 1949 with reservation 
on Article VI & VIII  
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. New York, 7 March 1966 Not a party 
2a. Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis rimination. 
New York, 15 January 1992 
Not a party 
3. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York, 16 December 1966 Party since 2015 
3a. Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York, 10 Dec 2008 Not a party 
4. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York, 16 December 1966 Not a party 
4a. Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York, 16 December 1966 Not a party 
4b. Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (death penalty). New York, 15 Dec 1989 Not a party 
5. Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity. New York, 
26 November 1968 
Not a party 
6. Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. New York, 30 November 1973 Not a party 
7. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York, 18 December 1979 Party since 1997 with 
reservations on Article 29 
7a. Amendment to article 20, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. New York, 22 December 1995 
Not a party 
7b. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York, 
6 October 1999 
Not a party 
8. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. New York, 10 
December 1984 
Not a party 
8a. Amendments to articles 17 (7) and 18 (5) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. New York, 8 September 1992 
Not a party 
8b. Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. New York, 18 December 2002 
Not a party 
9.  Convention against Apartheid in Sports. New York, 10 December 1985 Not a party 
10. Convention on the Rights of the Child. New York, 20 November 1989 Party since 1991. Withdrew 
reservations on Article 15 & 37.  
10a. Amendment to article 43 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. New York, 12 December 1995 Party since Jun 2000 
Annex A
10b. Optional Protocol to the Convention on Rights of Child (involvement of children in armed conflict). New York, 
25 May 2000 
Party since 2015  
10c. Optional Protocol to the Convention on Rights of Child (sale, prostitution and pornography). New York, 25 May 
2000 
Party since 16 Jan 2012 
10d. Optional Protocol to the Convention on Rights of Child (communications procedure). New York, 19 Dec 2011 Not a party 
11. Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families. New York, 18 Dec 1990 Not a party 
12. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. New York, 13 December 2006 Not a party 
12a. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. New York, 13 December 2006 Not a party 
13. Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. New York, 20 December 2006 Not a party 
14. Geneva Conventions, 1949 Party since 25.08.1992 
14a. Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 Not a party 
14b. Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 Not a party 
14c. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 Party since 15.07.1991 
14d. Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 2000 Party since 28.09.2015 





Annex B: Summary of the CSOs Shadow Report on Human Rights Situation in Myanmar to the UN CEDAW Committee 2015-2016 
CSOs Relevant Observations /Recommendations 
Amnesty 
International 
Reports Lack of clarity in several draft laws (i.e. Population Control Healthcare Laws, Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law) and 
their potential negative impact in a context where the Rohingyas are denied citiz nship and many of the rights and protections. Report 
claims that the draft Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, as it stands, could be interpreted ‘‘to target specific communities identified 
on a discriminatory basis, in violation of international human rights law’’  calls for several measures to safeguards against discrimination, 
and the proposed practice of coercive reproductive control such as coerced abortion or forced sterilization (p.5-7).  
CEDAW Action 
Myanmar (CAM) 
Recommends zero tolerance policy on violence against women and sexual harassment in conflict-affected areas an  transparent trial 





Focuses on Kachin and Shan peoples but express concern about violence against women from religious minorities. Report claims that 
‘rape is used as a weapon of war’ by Myanmar military and recommends the GoM ‘to end the culture of impunity’ for such crimes. (p.2).  
Global Justice 
Center (GJC)  and 
Gender Equality 
Network (GEN) 
Observes that the Rohingya’s are subject to systematic discrimination and their right to self-determination are continually denied. (pp.101-
105). It recommends that GoM must combat ‘‘Burma’s culture of victim blaming’’ and acknowledge ‘‘military’s historical and ongoing 
use of sexual violence in conflict’’ and prohibit such practice through legislation, policies, protocols and a zero tolerance policy. (p. 120). 
The 2016 GJC and GEN joint report also recommends to eliminate ‘‘impunity for the military and Government actors, including 
immunities provided for in the Constitution and by legislation. It specifically calls for the trial of military personnel accused of such 
crimes in civilian courts or in military courts under the Prevention (and Protection) of Violence against Women (PoVAW) law. (p.24).  
The Arakan 
Project 
The 2015 Report notes that rape incidents increased from June 2012, perpetrated by State actors in northern Rakhine State (p.12). It 
recommends GoM to combat all acts of incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence against religious and ethnic minorities, in 




Report recommends to provide information on ''efforts to investigate, prosecute, or pr vent’ gender based violence in northern Arakan 
State committed by the military, police Border Guard and Ma Ka Pa’ (p.5).  The 2016 report mentions the act of rape, gang rape and 
brutal killings of Rohingya women in northern Rakhine State and notes that ‘justifications’ for such act include punishment for alleged 
membership of their sons or husbands in insurgent groups or for their failure to fulfil their forc d labour duties (p.8).  
Women's League 
of Burma 
Report notes that ‘women [in Rakhine state] are driven out of the village’ (Annex, p.1) and claims that GoM has ‘failed to take action to 
address violence against women’ and to develop and implement ‘adequate legal, support, or policy measures to eliminate violence against 





Outline GoM measures for improving the gender based violence. It observes that Myanmar’s reservation on Article 29 upon ratification 
is a hindrance for the effective protection for women’s rights calling the GoM to withdraw the reservation.  
Source: Author’s compilation.  
Annex B
Annex C: Summary of the Key Actions by the Host Country and Other Actors to Establish the Four ICTs. 
ICTs Resolution 
Prepared by 
Reports to the 
Committee 
Documents/Actions by Host State and Other Actors Reflecting Political Will Outcome 








and Addendum 1) 
Host: Yugoslavia challenged the legality claiming that any trial should be under its ‘national 
laws, which are harmonised with international law and by competent judicial authorities, in 
accordance with the principle of territorial jurisdiction’ (A/48/170, S/25801, 21 May 1993). 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia Joined the meeting without the right to vote. 
Others: Mexico (S/25417), Canada (S/25504 and S/25594, S/25765), Russia (S/2553, S/25829), 
Brazil (S/25540), USA (S/25575, S/25829); Slovenia (S/25652); Netherlands (S/25716), France

















Host: Rwanda denied any ‘systematic and organised killings’, 'mass exodus of people' to 
Tanzania and that ‘refugees are not returning because of insecurity'. Questioning UNHCR's 
motive, it blamed ‘irresponsible media' for ‘encouraging divisive mentalities among the 
Rwandese along ‘‘ethnic’’ lines’. Requested the UN to reinforce government efforts to establish 
international tribunal by committing funds and voted against the Resolutions as a non-permanent 
member of the UNSC (S/1994/1115 29 September 1994). 









GoSL and the 
ECOWAS Report  
Host: GoSL requests for establishing a ‘Special Court’ to pursue justice in light of the provisions 
of the Lomé Peace Agreement to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leon.  
Others. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) supported to establish the 
'Special Court'. UN interpretd the amnesty provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement does not 
include crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of 








on the ‘Situation of 
human rights in 
Cambodia’ 
Host: In August 1979, The People's Revolutionary Tribunal tried the Khmer Rouge perpetrators 
in absentia and found them guilty. However, the Tribunal is said to have failed me ting 
international fair trial standards. Cambodia requested UN assistance, insisting local ownership 
for the trials to facilitate national reconciliation, strengthening democracy and individual 
accountability. In 2001, the Parliament passed the ECCC Law, signed an agreement with the UN 
in 2003 and ratified the UN-Cambodia ECCC Agreement that entered into force in 2005.  
Others: Apart from the UN and EU, 29 countries, two individuals (David Scheffer, William 
Schabas), three business entities (Foundation Open Society Institute, Microsoft, Information 
Today Inc) donated funds for the ECCC. Japan remains the highest (30 percent) donor.  
Para 16 of 
Resolution 
A/RES/52/135 
accepts & Para 
17, 
A/RES/53/145 
ppoints a group 
of experts. 
Source: Author’s compilation from relevant UN documents and letters. 
Annex C
